'Life is a state of Mind' - Fiction, Society and Trump by Diken, Bulent & Laustsen, Carsten B.
‘Life is a state of mind’ – on fiction, society and Trump 
 




… cinema is like a kind of great archetypal womb that contains in 
embryogenetic potential all visions of the world. (Morin 2005: 169) 
 
It is common today to compare cinema to dreaming. In both cases we are physically 
immobile but emotionally mobile in a ‘psychological coenesthesia’ (Morin 2005: 97). In 
this sense cinema allows one to deviate from oneself, become another. By the same token, 
it deepens the social imagination and may even, in some cases, be ahead of social reality. It 
can function as an indicator of the virtual, a coming society. This is why social reality 
sometimes appears as a fallout effect of cinematic virtualities, producing the uncanny 
impression that reality mirrors cinema and not the other way around.  
In this article we seek to build upon this impression along three lines. We first 
articulate a general commentary on the relationship between cinema and society, 
introducing the concept of ‘socio-fiction’. Secondly, we analyse Peter Sellers’ Being 
There, an interesting film focused on the relationship between reality and fiction. In this 
analysis we elaborate on different ways of approaching fiction in a sociological prism. And 
finally we discuss Trump as a fallout effect of Being There. After all, a film is not just an 
image of a reality, a shadow or appearance of a social fact; sometimes the reality itself 
seems to have become an appearance of an appearance, a shadow of a shadow. 
 
Introduction: a brief note on cinema and society 
This reversal can be partially grounded in social change. Cinema is today one of the most 
important arenas for the distribution of lay knowledge. As Deleuze said, cinema is the 
‘contemporary art of the masses’ (1989: 157-62). It has a distinct power to shape and fold 
social relations as well as the most intimate and the most public desires and fears. In this 
sense cinema functions as a kind of social unconscious: it interprets, invents, displaces and 
distorts the object of sociological inquiry, opening up the social world to a vast domain of 
possibilities. 
In this prism a film can be approached in two ways. On the basis of an external 
reading, it can be inscribed into a ‘network’ of social determinants. A film is a work 
positioned in a broader field, as something ‘necessitated’ (Bourdieu 1992) by the social 
structures and struggles within the artistic field which is itself positioned in relation to 
other fields such as economic, social, political and so on. Film and the commentary on it, 
in this perspective, are part of a network. And the task of analysis in this context is to give 
an insight into the social conditions of the artwork, to liberate from misrecognitions and 
‘false transcendences’ common in the field of art (Bourdieu 1982: 56). 
However, an internal reading would hold the view that, as an artistic product, a film 
cannot be reduced to its network. As an artwork every film contains an excess, an intensity, 
which transcends its social network, its conditions of production and reception. Indeed, 
cinema is an art precisely because of this intensive surplus, its sense-making capacity, and 
analytic sociological concepts cannot capture this surplus unless they themselves (can) 
engage with artful commentary that can do justice to the artistic aspect of cinema. 
Significantly in this respect, cinema is an art form that borrows from other forms of art, 
from the theatre, music, photography et cetera (Badiou 2005: 84). It is ‘impure’ and the 
artistic aspect of a film can only be distinguished ‘as a process of purification of its own 
immanent non-artistic character’ (ibid.). Cinema is necessitated but at the same time it 
strives for autonomy and ‘purification’. The defining characteristic of art is its striving for 
autonomy, its attempt at purification, even when its network prevents it.  
Reading a film in the prism of social theory, then, is necessarily navigating in a zone 
of indeterminacy between artwork and network, in a zone of indistinction between internal 
and external approaches to cinema. Social theory is itself conditioned by and tied to the 
real, the society it observes, but it also strives for independence and autonomy, which 
allows it to develop a critical stance towards its object. As such, as a fiction, ‘theory is 
simply a challenge to the real’ (Baudrillard 1987: 124). 
Written in this spirit, this article undertakes an allegorical double reading of Being 
There and Trump as instances of what we call socio-fiction. Crucially in this respect, 
reality and fiction are not two opposed realms. The two realms always interact in subtle 
ways, which is why cinema can be a resource for diagnostic social analysis. Hence there is 
a close relationship between ideology and cinema. Althusser (1984) once claimed that the 
school and the Church were the most important ideological apparatuses. Today cinema 
must be added to the list as thinking about memory and counter-memory is increasingly 
impossible without thinking about cinema. Cinema is interesting for social sciences 
precisely in this context, in its capacity for dramatization and, in a certain sense, 
‘actualization’ of the cinematic fiction in socio-political settings.  
 
Being There 
Being There is a film that deals with the relationship between reality and fiction.  The film 
(directed by Hall Asby) tells the story of the not especially gifted Mr Chance (Peter 
Sellers) who has lived his entire life as a rich man’s gardener, never leaving his house. 
Hence the only thing he knows about the outside world is through what he has seen on 
television. However, when Chance’s ‘employer’ dies, the house is put on the market and 
Chance is forced to leave. Chance leaves the house in his master’s fine clothes which he 
‘inherits’. He has his remote control with him. But he quickly discovers that in the real 
world nothing immediately obeys the remote control. He is though relieved as he comes 
past a television business, where his remote control works again in relation to the TV sets 
on display. Yet, the relief is short-lived as a large car suddenly backs towards him. 
Anxious to get sued, the car’s rich owner Mr Ben Rand and his wife Eve invite Chance to 
their home, hoping to win his sympathy. 
At the Biltmore Estate Chance tells Ben about himself and how, under unlucky 
circumstances, he has been forced to leave his house. Here he is also offered alcohol for 
the first time in his life. Slightly drunk, he cannot pronounce his name clearly. So ‘Chance 
the gardener’ is heard by Ben as ‘Chauncey Gardiner’, obviously a respected and wealthy 
family name. In his master’s clothes Chance appears, too, to be respectable and wealthy. 
So Ben concludes that Chance is an unfortunate businessman who went bankrupt. The two 
fast become friends. Chance keeps talking about his garden, about when it must be sown, 
claiming that after spring comes summer and then autumn, so the garden must be harvested 
before the winter, and so on. It’s all completely trivial, but Ben misinterprets Chance’s 
statements as metaphors for how the economy will evolve. Appreciating Chance’s 
‘wisdom’ Ben introduces him to elite political circles, including a good friend of him, the 
President.  
What follows is reminiscent of The Emperor's New Clothes. Chance’s platitudes are 
constantly interpreted as an expression of depth. His message of a coming spring, for 
insatnce, turns out to be exactly what Ben and the President would like to hear. Being weak 
in the polls the President is more than ready to welcome any statement econonomic 
recovery. Soon Chance starts to appear on television shows where his trivial statements 
are, again, generously misinterpreted. People identify with Chance for unlike other 
politicians he uses a simple language and answers questions ‘directly’. His popularity 
grows so fast that the President’s advisors consider him as the next presidential candidate. 
Chance’s lack of background, paradoxically, becomes his strength. Since he is a 
similacrum he can be objectionable to no one (see Hamilton 2004). 
When Ben dies, it turns out that he has left the castle to Eve, who in the meanwhile 
has fallen in love with Chance. Towards the end of the film, in Ben’s funeral, the President 
quotes from Chance’s wisdom (referring to his winged sentences such as ‘Life is a state of 
mind’ and ‘Life is what you make it’). On leaving the ceremony Chance picks up a tree 
which is bowled and fixes it (he is and remains the Chance the gardener). And in the final 
scene, we watch him approaching a lake. Then he starts to walk on water! Sticking about 
half way his umbrella into the water he tries to see how deep the water is. But he cannot hit 
the bottom. Apparently, there is no limit to his magic.  
 
Cynicism 
Why does Chance has so much success? He has limited experience, capacity and taste. His 
inability to relate to reality, however, turns out to be his strength in a society where surface 
platitudes and appearances mean everything. His complete devotion to television is an 
asset in a society captivated by visual communication. In this respect Chance reveals an 
unexpected proximity of human and the animal in his lack of potential-not-to (Agamben 
2004: 67). He cannot distance himself from automatic behaviour characteristic of the 
animal, defined by the impossibility of such suspension, of breaking down its relation to its 
environment (Ibid. 69-70). 
However, cinematic fiction conveys more than television spectatorship. After all, 
Chance constantly zaps between the channels. He cannot focus on anything, not even 
under Ben’s funeral. The whole thing flickers in front of him. But the society around him is 
worse. People happily swallow platitudes. They are not interested in political messages, 
only in their form. Theirs – ours – is a society in which depth and surface is obliterated, a 
society obsessed with signs, images and sign systems, an increasingly ‘cinematized’ 
society. Hence the mystery of cinema: its obviousness. 
And it isn’t just the reality of the real that’s at issue in all this, but the reality of cinema. It’s a little 
like Disneyland: the theme parks are now merely an alibi – masking the fact that the whole context of 
life has been disneyfied. It’s the same with cinema: the films produced today are merely the visible 
allegory of the cinematic form that has taken over everything – social and political life, the landscape, 
war, etc. – the form of life totally scripted for the screen. (Baudrillard 2005: 124-5) 
The dysneyfied ‘society’ is nothing more than the myriads of images without depth. Can 
we not make the same point in relation to Chance himself? His ‘pathological’ 
preoccupation with television creates the fantasy that there is a non-pathological way, that 
the society itself has not become cinematic.  Following this logic, the distinction between 
reality and fiction, between society and film, is impossible to maintain. But does the film 
not, in a nostalgic fashion, draw precisely upon the distinction between fact and fiction? 
Or, to put it in other terms, if society is completely hollowed out and reduced to a surface, 
where can we find the depth and reality, which we can refer to in trying to counter this 
superficiality? 
At one point Ben’s doctor discovers that Chance is actually just a gardener. 
However, he does not say it to Ben and Eve for he can see how much they enjoy Chance’s 
company. They are intoxicated by the surface, by signs, and awakening to the real can only 
be painful. What we have here is cynicism par excellence. Ben’s doctor knows well that 
Chance is a construction but nevertheless does not act accordingly. Consequently, what is 
immoral appears as its opposite. It is precisely through the (mis)conception of an ‘I’ 
outside the reach of ideology that the ideology is sustained. But cynicism must not be 
confused with ‘false consciousness.’ The cynic is aware of the distance between the 
ideological mask and the social reality but he insists upon the mask. It is in this gap that 
cynicism, the lack of affect, paradoxically becomes an affect; not as a direct position of 
immorality but rather as a morality that serves immorality (see Žižek 1989: 29-30). 
This is also the point in the film at which the distinction between society and the 
individual collapses. Hence the film could be criticized for portraying an over-socialized 
individual who is totally captured by the dominant ideology, fully absorbed by images and 
the media. A possible way out might be to understand fiction in a different way, not simply 
as images and surface, but also in terms of performances, expectations and fantasies.  
  
Socio-fiction 
‘Reality’ is always traversed by fiction, by fantasy. Fantasy is not a dreamlike illusion that 
serves to escape reality but the very basis for social life (Žižek 1989: 45). In other words, 
reality and fiction are not two opposed realms. Fantasies are on our minds; but they are 
also manifested in social practices irreducible to individual behavior. Thus fantasy belongs 
to the strange realm of the ‘objective subjective’:   
What, then, is fantasy at its most elementary? The Ontological paradox, scandal even, of fantasy 
resides in the fact that it subverts the standard opposition of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’: of course, 
fantasy is by definition not objective (referring to something that exists independently of the subject’s 
perceptions); however, it is also not subjective (something that belongs to the subject’s consciously 
experienced intuitions, the product of his or her imaginations). Fantasy rather belongs to the ‘bizarre 
category of the objectively subjective – the way things actually, objectively seem to you even if they 
don’t seem that way to you’. (Žižek 2006) 
The two realms, the subjective and the objective, are always blurred and always interact in 
subtle ways. We are always within the ‘objectively subjective’. Society never exists ‘as 
such’ but is only ‘seen’ as distorted through a gaze. Consequently, one could reverse the 
distinction between reality and fiction:  
[T]he ultimate achievement of film art is not to recreate reality within the narrative fiction, to seduce 
us into (mis)taking a fiction for reality, but, on the contrary, to make us discern the fictional aspect of 
reality itself, to experience reality itself as a fiction. (Žižek 2001: 77) 
Cinema both represents and signifies. It remixes ‘the real, the unreal, the present, real life, 
memory, and dream on the same shared mental level’ (Morin 2005: 202). The imaginary 
capacity of cinema, its production of images, is paralleled by the imaginary potential of the 
human mind. Cinema increases the capacity for interaction between man and his world. 
‘Cinema is exactly this symbiosis: a system that tends to integrate the spectator into the 
flow of the film. A system that tends to integrate the flow of the film into the psychic flow 
of the spectator’ (ibid. 102). However, the relationship works the other way around as well. 
Thus it is possible to say that it is not cinema which serves as a royal route to the 
understanding of the mind but inversely it is the mind, or rather the unconscious, that 
manifests itself in social reality. The unconscious is exterior (Lacan 1966: 469). 
Whereas Morin considers the unconscious as the imaginary capacity of the human 
mind to overflow social reality, according to Lacan the unconscious is contained within the 
symbolic order, ‘structured like language’ (Lacan 1993: 167). The symbolic (language, the 
law, or what sociology calls rules and norms) is not a self-contained unit. The big Other 
(society), the entity in which we mirror ourselves (as the nation, as God, et cetera), can 
only exist as a mirror projection, it can only have an imaginary unity. ‘In spite of all its 
grounding power, the big Other is fragile, insubstantial, properly virtual, in the sense that 
its status is that of a subjective presupposition’ (Žižek 2006). Considering this fictional 
ground of the big Other, one is tempted to claim that the unconscious is structured like a 
film. 
Fiction cannot be limited to images and representations and thus be understood as 
secondary phenomena. In a certain sense fiction is primary. Fantasy is the anchoring point 
of reality. Chance is for Eve and Ben Chauncey precisely Mr. Gardiner – not a gardener, 
but a representative for the upper class. Likewise, society for Chance is a garden… And 
one could go on. Thus we read on Ben’s coffin: Life is a state of mind written on Ben’s 
coffin. Life, reality, is the way we live and make sense of life. What is central here is that 
life (the real) and mind (our imagination) are drawn together. 
Following the same logic, the concept of ‘socio-fiction’ seeks to bring sociality and 
fiction together. The concept can, first, be related to the classical ideology critique: 
‘Society’ is grounded in a set of unconscious fantasies which we are all immersed in. But, 
secondly, it can also refer to the fact that all live life in their own, specific ways. And 
thirdly, fiction can also refer to the absence of referents while the absence of a solid 
anchoring in ‘reality’ means that the attempts to fill this void are necessarily unstable and 
preliminary. Let us now move towards this third reading of the relationship between film 
and reality, a reading of the film, which does not contrast these cultural producst with 
reality but considers them as fundamentally ambiguous and therefore also as contested 
objects in a war of meaning. The notion of modification is central in this respect.  
 
Modification 
Filmic narratives and images can be transposed into a more or less ideological space 
through  practices of reading and might as such be transfunctioned for a critical end 
(Lapsley and Westlake 2006: 51). To this effect, the situationist Asger Jorn overpainted 
kitsch paintings to release their utopian potential through what he called ‘modifications’ 
(Jay 1993: 424). In this way the protopolitical impulses that are managed and channeled 
through mass culture can be activated (Jameson 1981: 287). However, the situationist 
ontological assumptions are problematic in that they perceived bourgeois art (or mass 
culture) as essentially regressive in character and understood their mission as adding to it 
something that can displace its meaning. In this, they presupposed two ontological layers: 
the ideological canvas and its avant-garde modifications. Their task was to add something 
to an already devalued medium, bourgeois art as kitsch.  
The situationists expected that experimentation with new forms of art would break 
the power of the reified image. One way to fight the reified image was to create works of 
art manifestly marked by its producer’s presence. For instance, Lemaítre’s Syncinema 
aimed at transgressing the spectator-spectacle divide by making the actors reappear as 
physical persons mingling with the spectators. Likewise, Brechtian techniques were 
applied to reinsert the artist within the filmic narrative. In a similar way, Debord made use 
of various Hulements such as introducing a disjunction between the voiceover and the 
images to force the spectator out of the dark. Stories were no longer told from nowhere and 
this forced the spectator to reflect upon the ‘real’, the materiality of the cinematic media. 
We encounter a similar disjunction in the final scene of Being There, when Chance 
crosses the lake walking on the water. To be sure, one could interpret this scene as a 
metaphor: Chance is so lucky that he can walk on water, the people around him invest so 
much in him that he appears as a Jesus-like figure, and so on. Such metaphors might be 
interesting but we must instead emphasize the visual element in the scene. We have here 
two layers that are brought together in the same way as images and sound shortcircuit each 
other in Debord’s Hulements. Consequently, we are confronted with the same artificiality, 
with the film as a film. The scene is obviously made using the technique of montage, 
selecting and piecing together separate sections with and without Chance. What is 
interesting is the place where Chance dots hole in the water with his umbrella. It creates a 
dissonance: not only do we find ourselves in a world without physical and social gravity (a 
world without a reality principle), this world is also in itself ambivalent and fragmented. 
Freud (1983) had contrasted the reality principle with the pleasure principle. Insofar 
as the individual’s search for unlimited pleasure is self-destructive, it must be kept in check 
by another, reality principle. Being There, too, plays the two principles against one another. 
On the one hand, therefore, the film can be read as a critique of excessive emphasis on the 
pleasure principle. The film depicts a world which seems to lack references to a reality that 
can modify, derail or otherwise interact with their imagined worlds. It is a world without a 
reality principle, a world of pure pleasure. The characters create their own world, exactly 
as they wish. Life is a state of mind. On the other hand, though, the film attempts at 
introducing a kind of reality check. Its final scene thus forces us to relate to the film as 
film. Along the same lines, the final relativizes the previous scenes, seeking to un-bond, at 
the same time, the spectator from her libidinal captivation. But it does so not by referring 
to another solid ground – Chance sticks the umbrella in the water but does not reach the 
bottom. There is no ground. Hence the film relativizes the visual, the film itself, and hence 
the social. 
 
From Chance to Trump1 
‘No, I meant he’s the founder of ISIS,’ Trump repeatedly insisted, refusing to back down 
from his false claim that Obama was the founder of ISIS. The conservative radio host 
Hugh Hewitt offered Trump a way out by reframing his claim: ‘I know what you meant – 
you meant that he created the vacuum, he lost the peace…’ Trump merely replied ‘I don't 
care’ and doubled down on literal interpretation: ‘He was the founder. His, the way he got 
out of Iraq was that that was the founding of ISIS, okay?’ (Bixby et al. 2016 and Kopan 
2016). 
In his remarkable distance to, lack of reality, Trump is a simulation reminiscent of 
Chance. Trump does not exist. There are already written thousands of pages about Trump’s 
incomparable ability to oversee the truth. Most commentators were outraged: how can he 
afford so completely to ignore reality and, despite all factual evidence, continue claiming 
those absurdities? Then there came the meta-comments about the futility of indignation, 
which led to equally little change as indignation did in the first place. Finally, there have 
been many comments from those who did not believe in Trump, claiming that Trump 
means what he says. For them Trump is a clown playing with power and he just has found 
the natural next step in his career as a performer: the world’s greatest reality show, the 
American presidential election. 
                                                 
1 Some of the ideas in this section builds upon our previous co-operation with Ask Foldspang Neve. Thanks to 
Neve for allowing us to re-use them here. 
To be sure, one could say that Trump is commodity par excellence of a post-
intellectual, hyperreal world. Just as Chance is unable to write or read, Trump seems to be 
illiterate enough to confuse Paris with the capital of Germany. Just as Chance’s, his 
emptiness is on display. But is it completely invisible to his admirers? Can people (read: 
the … Trump followers who seem so incomprehensible) really not see that there will be 
built no wall against Mexico, that you can’t just deport Mexicans or reject all Muslims, or 
that Obama could not directly have founded ISIS? An answer would be: no, people do not 
understand the proper context of things for they are intoxiated with our society’s mulptiple 
opiates. This is the fundamental point of view in the standard Marxist ideology critique. So 
is it just up to the rebels, philosophers, artists and other lucid thinkers to speak up and 
reveal the true nature of power. But are people really unaware of things, of the world’s true 
context? Not immediately, if we are to believe Sloterdijk (1988) and Žižek (1989), who 
describe the form of modern ideology as given by a cynical attitude.  
Marx writes in Das Kapital: ‘they do not know it, but [nevertheless] they do it’. But 
the modern subject ‘knows it, and does it anyway’. The cynic knows that his performances 
are ‘fake’, false and simulated. His attitude toward ideology is thus ironic. But despite this 
ironic distance, he insists on it in practice. The cynic knows that the emperor has nothing 
on but nevertheless insists on treating him as emperor, because this practice constitutes a 
community of followers and enables an enjoyment. This understanding of cynicism is akin 
to Samuel Coleridge’s idea that the suspension of suspicion is a prerequisite to enjoy 
fiction. Any one who watches Game of Thrones knows that it is not a documentary but 
must let herself be carried away in the moment in order to get something out of watching 
it. 
Hence with Trump it won’t help to unmask power, to undress it. Trump is a new kind 
of Emperor, who himself insists that he has nothing on. There’s nothing to strip power here 
as the power basically is not about anything other than the desire to govern. Trump’s 
economic adviser, Andrew Beal, defended Trump’s lack of economic policy and his own 
lack of knowledge about economy as follows: If you’re hiring someone to be a chief 
executive, you don’t ask them to lay out every decision they’ll make, years ahead of when 
they’ll make it. You hire someone whom you trust, and you let them run things. Beal says 
he knows that Trump will do the right things to make the economy perform better. ‘You’re 
going to say, “How?”’ he told me. ‘I don’t know how. I know that sounds crazy. That’s 
how the real world operates’ (High Stakes Database 2016). Managing the economy is like 
steering a ship safely through the waters. No one knows the challenges that lie ahead, so 
the only thing you can hope for is that one has hired a good skipper. And in Beal’s eyes it’s 
Trump. Insight and knowledge are subordinate. What it is about is strenght of will and 
impact. Herein lies the greatest danger with Trump, the reduction of politics to passion, 
which is exacerbated everyt time commentators approve Trump’s ‘conviction’ and claim 
that his plain speech is part of his appeal. 
Like Chance, Trump is private idiosyncrasies, platitudes, a bit on weapons, 
populism, wild suggestions, and so on. What’s interesting here is that Trump has 
absolutely no ambition to stage these as a coherent program. The only thing that remains is 
the desire to govern. Reality is what you say reality is. Beal himself seems to embody this. 
He challenged, for example, one of the world’s brightest poker poker players, Phil Ivey, 
and lost of course with a bang: 16 million dollars in three days (Olsen 2016). One wonders, 
nervously, how much Trump can lose in four years in the White House as the irony of the 
situation shows its potential for tragedy. 
But Trump does not represent a higher rationality. He’s just Trump. The question is 
really whether it is Trump or his voters who are cynical? Or maybe both parties, as when 
we watch a movie or a show? Everyone knows that it is a spectacle, but they still attends it. 
Perhaps the most obvious show to compare with Trump’s campaign is pro wrestling, which 
many American commentattors already did. For the uninitiated, pro wrestling is a martial 
arts show, which mixes sports and personal drama, a sort of macho soap. The spectator 
follows not only the individual fight, the result of which is agreed in advance, but also the 
story before and after. It is almost always the good against the evil in an epic but two-
dimensional universe. 
Trump himself has a long background in wrestling, and he has even been in the ring. 
So he must learned from wrestling that it’s all a show, that one must keep on bragging and 
always search scandal to keep the audiences happy. Give your fans something they can be 
enthusiastic about, give your enemies something to tear apart, and give the journalists 
something to write about. Lie is better than the truth. 
Trump’s approach evokes reminiscences of Berlusconi’s background as a cruise ship 
crooner or, of course, Reagan’s and Schwarzenegger’s as actors. But wrestling is more 
basic, and more mundane, and therefore also even more potent as narrative form. It arouses 
disgust of those who cultivate mindfulness but has a huge and surprisingly broad fan base. 
The audience for a wrestling match is of course cynics. They know very well that it 
is a show, but allow themselves to be carried away anyway. Otherwise it would be futile to 
see it. So you do not get anywhere by shouting at the crowd up and making them aware 
that it is not authentic. You will be probably just booed into silence or thrown out. People 
want to have the show they came for in peace. 
Similarly, some of the excitement over Trump among ‘us others’ is grounded in the 
fact that he readily confesses that he is an emperor without clothes on. He openly taunts the 
liberal-democratic tradition, where politicians always have argued through half-truths, 
always have only mentioned the part of reality, which fits into their own argument. 
Significantly in this context, democracy is a paradoxical concept in that it can always 
degenerate into a perfect environment for ressentiment covered as an apparently moral 
demand for justice.  
This potential for internal perversion is as old as democracy itself; hence the 
significance of the concept of tyranny in Ancient political philosophy. According to Plato, 
for instance, tyranny is above all an expression of the perversion of democracy. 
Democracy can always sweep the principles of good government away with a pretentious, 
populist gesture: people are offered offices and honored only because ‘they profess 
themselves the people’s friends’ (1977: VIII 558d). The resultant society is invaded by 
‘pretentious fallacies and opinions’ (Ibid. VIII 560c). And when a democratic society falls 
‘under the influence of bad leaders’ who intoxicate it with the pleasures of excess (ibid. 
VIII 562d), democracy passes into tyranny iIbid. VIII 562a).  
To be sure, in this process populism plays a significant role. But with Trump we 
seem to be confronted with a new, post-political version of populism. Insofar as politics is 
politicization, ‘post-politics’ signifies the foreclosure of politics. In this sense, post-politics 
is already a perverted form of democracy, a ‘post-democratic’ politics that eliminates real 
dispute by assuming that everyone is already included in politics and that remaining 
problems can be dealt with through expert systems (Rancière 1999: 116). Interestingly, in 
this sense, as technocratic consensus politics, Trump would seem to be a reaction against 
post-politics. Yet, he is post-political in another way. Just as society for Chance is a 
garden, society is for Trump an oikos. 
In the above interview, the host continues to say that by using the term ‘founder’ 
Trump just gives the Democrats free ammunition, because it obviously is wrong. Is it not a 
mistake? ‘No, it’s not a mistake’, answers Trump. Being a fiction himself, Trump creates 
his own reality in a way reminiscent of Chance walking on water. And as such we love to 
puncture his rambling outburst one after one. But there is here an infatuation at play, which 
cuts deeper than the one Trump’s followers, and perhaps Trump himself, suffer from. Not 
an enlightened false consciousness, but simply a false consciousness.  
Apropos of Disneyland perhaps Trump, paradoxically, is the anchor of our reality 
today. Just as the real function of Disneyland is the hide the fact that the rest of America is 
fake, Trump is what enables and sustain the fantasy that our politics is serious and well-
grounded. Perhaps the true merit of Trumpism consists in challenging this fantasy. Under 
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